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THE UNILATERAL CREATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE “WAR ON
TERROR”: MURDER BY AN UNPRIVILEGED
BELLIGERENT IS NOT A WAR CRIME
Noman Goheer*
INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2006, just five days after the Supreme Court ruled in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 prosecuting attorneys Professor Neal Katyal
of Georgetown University Law Center and Lieutenant Commander
Charles Swift flew to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Guantánamo) to
meet their client, Salim Hamdan, and tell him the Supreme Court
declared the military commissions he was to be tried under uncon-
stitutional.2  While explaining their seminal victory to Hamdan,
they said that “[i]n 50 to 100 years, law students will be reading this
case and reading your name.”3  Hamdan responded that “[m]aybe
I’ll change my name.  I just want to go home.”4
While Hamdan’s resignation is understandable considering
his five-year confinement at Guantánamo, the legal community be-
lieved Katyal and Swift did the impossible.5  They won a case strik-
ing down a judicial system that deprived its participants of
constitutional rights.6
In eight Military Commissions Instructions (MCI No. 1-8), the
Department of Defense (DOD) delineated procedures to guide the
* J.D. Candidate (2008), Washington College of Law, American University; M.A.
Candidate (2008), School of International Service – American University; B.A., Emory
University, 2005.  I am grateful to the J.A.G. officers at the Office of the Chief Defense
Counsel in the Office of Military Commissions at the Department of Defense for their
help, particularly Major Tom Fleener, Major Dan Mori, and Col. Dwight Sullivan.  I
am also grateful to Professor Rick Wilson, Tritia Yuen, and my family for their gui-
dance and support as I was writing this piece.  I also want to give special thanks to the
staff of the New York City Law Review.
1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2 See T.R. Goldman, Katyal’s Crusade: How an Overachieving Law Professor Toppled the
President’s Terror Tribunals, LEGAL TIMES, Jul. 31, 2006 at 1, 18, http://www.law.com/
jsp/article.jsp?id=1155027927847 (describing Neal Katyal’s unexpected win where the




5 See, e.g., id. at 17 (reporting a “prominent law professor’s” advice to Katyal as
“My real advice to you is to give up the argument”).
6 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
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war-crimes trials of the Guantánamo detainees.7  This Comment
discusses “murder by an unprivileged belligerent,” an offense
chargeable by military commissions in MCI No. 2.8
During the United States’ hostilities with the Taliban in No-
vember 2001, militia forces captured Hamdan and turned him over
to the U.S. military.9  In June 2002, the U.S. transported him to
Guantánamo where he was later charged with one count of con-
spiracy “to commit . . . offenses triable by military commission.”10
While Hamdan’s charge included conspiracy to commit murder by
an unprivileged belligerent, it did not include a direct charge of
murder by an unprivileged belligerent.  The only detainees
charged with either attempted murder by an unprivileged belliger-
ent or murder by an unprivileged belligerent in the original ten
commission trials prior to the enactment of the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 were Omar Khadr11 and David Hicks.12
7 DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMM’N INSTRUCTIONS, NOS. 1–8 (2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_instructions.html (follow
hyperlinks for individual Military Commission Instructions) [hereinafter MCI]. See
also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (defining the jurisdiction of a law of war military
commission as extending only to (1) “‘[v]iolations of the laws and usages of war cog-
nizable by military tribunals,’” and (2) “‘[b]reaches of military orders or regulations
which are not legally triable by court-martial’” (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS 839 (2d ed. 1920))); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27–10 DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 505(a), at 180 (1956),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL] (providing that “[a]ny person charged with a
war crime has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law”).
8 MCI NO. 2, supra note 7, § 6(B)(3), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf.  The Department of Defense defines
the crime of “Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent” as: a. Elements: (1) The accused
killed one or more persons; (2) The accused: (a) intended to kill or inflict great
bodily harm on such person or persons or (b) intentionally engaged in an act that is
inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard for human life; (3)
The accused did not enjoy combatant immunity; and (4) The killing took place in the
context of and was associated with armed conflict; b. Comments: (1) The term ‘kill’
includes intentionally causing death, whether directly or indirectly; (2) Unlike the
crimes of willful killing or attacking civilians, in which the victim’s status is a prerequi-
site to criminality, for this offense the victim’s status is immaterial.  Even an attack on
a soldier would be a crime if the attacker did not enjoy ‘belligerent privilege’ or ‘com-
batant immunity.’ Id.
9 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
10 Id.
11 See Charging Document at ¶¶ 23–24, United States v. Khadr, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/d20051104khadr.pdf (charging Khadr with the
murder of a U.S. soldier “while in the context of and associated with armed conflict
and without enjoying combatant immunity”).
12 See Charging Document at ¶ 21, United States v. Hicks, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040610cs.pdf (charging Hicks with the at-
tempted murder of Coalition forces “while he did not enjoy combatant immunity and
such conduct taking place in the context of and associated with armed conflict”).
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The charge murder by an unprivileged belligerent illustrates
the arbitrary nature of the military commissions.  The legal situa-
tion surrounding the “War on Terror” and the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon has created questions unan-
swerable through codified law.13  The issues became more complex
as President George W. Bush continued to use war powers without
a formal declaration of war,14 which caused confusion regarding
whether military law would be applicable during the “War on
Terror.”15
Murder by an unprivileged belligerent, like the charge of con-
spiracy used against Hamdan, is an unprecedented war crime ab-
sent from international law.  International law governing the use of
force in armed conflict is traditionally termed jus in bello (“the law
of war”), or more frequently “the law of armed combat,” and con-
stitutes part of United States law.16  This framework comprises the
body of rules that governs hostilities between States and hostilities
within States.
Customary international law plays a significant role in the law
of war.  Various laws-of-armed-combat conventions compose a body
of customary law that binds even non-parties to the conventions.17
13 See Michael Hoffman, Terrorists Are Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants:
A Distinction with Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law, 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 227, 228 (2002) (noting the undertaking necessary to define the
status of non-state actors involved in terrorist acts as a largely unexplored question).
14 See STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS,
“TIME OF WAR” AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, http://
sja.hqmc.usmc.mil/jam/time%20of%20war.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (declaring
that since September 11, 2001, there has not been a declaration of war by Congress
“nor a special finding by the President that UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]
‘Time of War’ exists”).
15 See id.
16 See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (integrating interna-
tional law into the U.S. common law by reviewing the history surrounding the adop-
tion of the United States Constitution). See generally UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § (A)(1.2), at 2 (2004) (providing the
United Kingdom’s interpretation of the law of armed combat and listing other synon-
ymous terms including “international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,”
and “international humanitarian law”).
17 See Affidavit of Michael N. Schmitt at 1, United States v. Hicks, available at http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051006vol10.pdf [hereinafter Schmitt Aff.]
(asserting that even though conventions require signatures to be binding, broad con-
ventions followed by many nations create customary international law that remains
binding on all nations).  The Schmitt affidavit was written for the trial of David Hicks,
an Australian detainee being tried by the previous commission system. See also Karma
Nabulsi, The Law: Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, in CRIMES OF WAR 223, 223 (Roy Guttman
& David Rieff eds., 1999) (adding that “military thinkers, backed by other scholars,
emphasize that the laws of war are drawn directly from the customs and practices of
war itself”).
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For example, even though the U.S. is not a signatory to the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it concedes
that the Protocol reflects the customary law of international
conflicts.18
In order to show that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is
not a war crime, this Comment begins with background on the ele-
ments of the charge, including the definitions of “privilege” and
“war crimes” in Part I.  Part II describes the potentially lawful status
of members of the Taliban and concedes the correct categorization
of members of al Qaeda as unprivileged belligerents.  After illus-
trating the charge’s absence in both international and domestic
law, Part III shows that the charge of murder by an unprivileged
belligerent does not conform to any instrument or interpretation
of law.  Next, Part IV uses the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to refute the charge while simultaneously using
the case for guidance in the construction of a new trial system for
the Guantánamo detainees.  Part V explains how the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006 treats the charge of murder by an un-
privileged belligerent.  Lastly, Part VI describes the various court
systems available to adjudicate the charge and ultimately argues for
a new court system based on the U.S. courts martial.  The Com-
ment concludes that the executive overstepped its bounds by creat-
ing a crime that does not comply with international and domestic
legal standards.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Privileged and Unprivileged Belligerency under U.S. Law and the
Geneva Conventions19
The term “unprivileged belligerent” is related to the term “un-
lawful combatant,” adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
18 See Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at
the Sixth Annual American Red Cross–Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 415, 419–20 (1987) (considering the United States legally
bound only by the provisions of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions that reflect
customary international law despite the failure of the United States to ratify that
Protocol).
19 See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
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Ex Parte Quirin20 “to describe the German saboteurs tried by mili-
tary commissions during World War II.”21  Terrorists are better
termed unprivileged belligerents because privileged belligerents
operate during armed hostilities and within the law of war, while
unprivileged belligerents operate outside the rules of war, whether
in times of war or relative peace.22
“Privileged” conflict refers to the mantle of protection that
comes with lawful combatancy under the law of armed combat,
particularly combatant immunity.23  According to Article 4(2) of
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention III), to gain privi-
leged status one must: belong to an organized group, belong to a
party to the conflict, be commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a dis-
tance, carry arms openly, and conduct one’s operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war.24
Not all who fight in wars are guaranteed this privilege.  For
example, since guerrillas25 conduct war in secret, it is improbable
that the group would comply with the wearing of insignia, automat-
ically disqualifying them from Geneva Convention protection.26
Though Article 44 of Additional Protocol I relaxed the insignia re-
quirement, it was recommended for rejection by the U.S. Presi-
dent.27  There are, however, other ways of gaining privilege outside
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
20 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
21 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 228 (describing the attempt by the executive branch
to adopt the Supreme Court’s definition of unlawful combatant).
22 Id. at 229 (contrasting unlawful combatants with terrorists, the latter of which
often attack during times of peace and against sites and people protected under inter-
national humanitarian law); see also William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After
9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 320 (2003) (labeling terrorists as
belligerents who lack rights of those lawfully engaged in combat).
23 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 234 (2004) (indicating that when the law of international
armed conflict negates a lawful status, the perpetrator is then vulnerable to ordinary
penal sanctions for acts in the domestic legal system).
24 Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, at 3320.
25 See Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas,
and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 333 (1951) (defining guerrilla warfare as
armed hostilities by private persons or groups who do not meet the qualifications
established under Article 4 of Geneva Convention III).
26 See id. at 336 (discussing the accounting of guerrilla tactics during war in cus-
tomary international law).
27 United States: Message of the President Transmitting Protocol II Additional to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninterna-
tional Armed Conflicts, Jan. 29, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 561. See also LESLIE C. GREEN, THE
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the Geneva Conventions.  Genuine allegiance and creditable sup-
port from the State on whose behalf they are undertaking the com-
bat would likely preclude international criminality.28
An irregular combatant is often a “part-time combatant[ ] who
do[es] not wear a uniform or carry arms openly when on active
duty,” but the term is not synonymous with guerrilla.29  Guerrillas
are distinguished from irregulars by the guerrillas’ choice to use
tactics such as “ambushes, sniping, and sabotage,” whereas irregu-
lars “might not use such tactics at all . . . .”30  Irregulars may be
considered lawful combatants in international conflicts if they ad-
here to the law of armed combat.31
As an unprivileged belligerent, an individual becomes vulnera-
ble to criminal prosecution under the domestic legal system.32  If
an individual’s status is questionable, the detaining power must
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 111 (2d ed. 2000) (recognizing that armed
forces of national liberation movements in World War II and conflicts since 1945 are
frequently not professional soldiers, but “farmers by day and soldiers by night”).
28 See Baxter, supra note 25, at 337 (interpreting customary international law as it
should apply to the reality of post-WWII warfare).
29 Ewen Allison, The Law: Irregulars, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 17, at 216
(describing common traits of irregular combatants).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HAND-
BOOK 17 (Maj. Joseph B. Berger III et al. eds., 2004), available at https://
www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf (fol-
low “2004 Operational Law Handbook” hyperlink; then follow “OLH2004.pdf” hyper-
link) [hereinafter U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK] (“Unprivileged belligerents are not
entitled to prisoner of war status, and may be prosecuted under the domestic law of
the captor.”); see also Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, ¶ 38, at 12–13 (deducing that an
unprivileged belligerent who kills a lawful combatant is subject to prosecution under
the domestic law of the State because lacking combatant immunity makes an individ-
ual vulnerable to domestic law if their alleged crime is not a violation of the law of
armed conflict); DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 237 (stating that as long as unlawful com-
batants do not commit crimes under international law, they may only be prosecuted
under domestic courts); ELIZABETH CHADWICK, SELF-DETERMINATION, TERRORISM AND
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 92 (1996) (stating that
terrorists are jurisdictionally isolated within domestic criminal law); George H. Al-
drich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L
LAW 891, 898 (2002) (emphasizing that members of al Qaeda are not entitled to law-
ful status under international law and are subject to trial and punishment under U.S.
domestic law). But see ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L
LAW, TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE HOSTILITIES IN
AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 19–20 (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/
goldman.pdf (stating that if a member of al Qaeda were captured off United States
soil for the 9/11 attacks, he could be tried as a common criminal; but because al
Qaeda is fighting alongside a State party to the Geneva Conventions in an interna-
tional armed conflict there must be careful analysis to determine their exact status in
the conflict).
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guarantee protection of Geneva Convention III until they deter-
mine the individual’s status by a competent tribunal.33  But the ac-
tual nature of the tribunal still remains in the hands of the
captor.34  The U.S. Army Field Manual defines a competent tribu-
nal as a “board of not less than three officers acting according to
such procedures as may be prescribed for tribunals of this na-
ture.”35  A military commission could potentially serve as a compe-
tent tribunal.36  The DOD did create Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs), though it is questionable whether or not they
constituted competent tribunals since they did not decide a de-
tainee’s entitlement to prisoner-of-war (POW) status, but whether
a detainee qualified as an “enemy combatant.”37
After the tribunal’s determination, the detainee would gain or
lose his rights accordingly.38  Since individuals subject to captivity
33 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142
(emphasizing that status must be competently and fairly determined before an indi-
vidual’s POW rights can be taken away).
34 See GREEN, supra note 27, at 112 (providing that a captive whose POW status is in
doubt will enjoy the protection of Geneva Convention III until his or her status is
determined by a “competent tribunal,” the nature of which is determined by the
captor).
35 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 71(c), at 30.
36 See Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A
Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantá-
namo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 619 (2002) (believing that a
military commission could serve this role if it fulfilled the requirements of Article 75
of Additional Protocol I by being a “regularly constituted court with regular judicial
procedures and impartiality”).
37 See Guantánamo Bay Detainees Overview: Current Status and Legal Challenges, INT’L
DEBATES, Apr. 2006, at 98, 99 (stating that critics viewed the CSRTs as insufficiently
complying with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004), because many believe Hamdi applies to all detainees, regardless of citizen-
ship). See also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (concluding that a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his status as an enemy combatant must be given an opportunity to do so).
See also DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL
PROCESS § (B), (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/
d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf (providing a non-adversarial proceeding to deter-
mine whether each detainee meets the criteria to be designated an enemy combat-
ant).  The Department of Defense defines an enemy combatant as:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.  This includes any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces.
Id.
38 See Press Release, Dep’t. of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Is-
sued (July 7, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=
7530 (“Any detainee who is determined not to be an enemy combatant will be trans-
ferred to their country of citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic
and international obligations and U.S. foreign policy.”); see also Guantánamo Bay De-
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of a detaining power retain the protection of the Geneva Conven-
tions until determined otherwise, only an “unprivileged” determi-
nation would remove the POW protection of the Geneva
Conventions.  Ultimately, the term “unprivileged” refers to a status
to be determined, not any particular crime.39  A combatant who
failed to follow the law and customs of war, or Article 4(A)(2) of
Geneva Convention III, may have committed a war crime as well.40
Even if a belligerent is deemed unprivileged, he or she is pro-
tected by Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions, which
applies to the treatment of all persons no longer taking part in the
hostilities.41  By its very nature Common Article 3 applies to unlaw-
ful combatants and to “conflicts ‘not of an international charac-
ter’”42 since the International Committee of the Red Cross created
the Article to “ensur[e] respect for the few essential rules of hu-
manity which all civilized nations consider as valid everywhere and
under all circumstances and as being above and outside war it-
self.”43  The International Committee of the Red Cross formulated
a similar but more specific provision in Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.44  It similarly estab-
tainees Overview, supra note 37, at 99 (“Of the 38 detainees determined not to be en-
emy combatants, 23 have been transferred to their home states.”).
39 Compare DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 31 (explaining that war criminals are
brought to trial for serious violations of the law of international armed conflict itself,
but the law of international armed conflict refrains from stigmatizing an unlawful
combatant’s acts as criminal and instead merely takes off the mantle of immunity),
with A.P.V. Rogers, The Law: Combatant Status, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 17, at 97
(asserting that noncombatants—those not directly participating in hostilities—who
commit war crimes by directly participating in hostilities may be prosecuted for any
attacks on people as common crimes, and that while their acts as noncombatants are,
therefore not war crimes, their direct participation in hostilities is a war crime).
40 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 39 (acknowledging that ultimately privileged sta-
tus requires adherence to the laws and customs of war, and if this is not properly
followed, it is likely the individual committed a war crime).
41 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3318–20, 75 U.N.T.S. at
136–38.
42 Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367,
400–01 (2004) (articulating Common Article 3’s applicability between states and in-
formal armed opposition groups).
43 Geneva Convention III, supra 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.  This
provision includes prohibitions against: (a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treat-
ment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previ-
ous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Id.
44 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37–38 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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lished minimum humanitarian protections to all persons “in the
power of” a belligerent State, irrespective of their role in the con-
flict, and whether they are entitled to “benefit from more favour-
able treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol.”45
B. War Crimes
War crimes represent serious breaches of the laws and customs
of war.46  The International Criminal Court defines war crimes as
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict not of an international character.”47  Furthermore, viola-
tions that endanger protected persons, objects, or breach impor-
tant values are treated as war crimes.48  Offenses against the
Geneva Conventions are referred to as “grave breaches,” and are
also considered war crimes.49  The U.S. definition mirrors these
definitions in the War Crimes Act of 1996.50  Murder by an un-
45 Id. at 37.
46  INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
I OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 888 (Claude Pil-
loud et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter RED CROSS COMMENTARY] (citing The Report of
the Int’l Law Comm’n, 3d Sess. vol. 4, at 59 (1951)); see also Agreement for the Prose-
cution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544 at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 at 288 (defining war crimes as “violations
of the laws or customs of war” and enumerating, but not limiting, violations as “mur-
der, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity
. . .”).
47 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(e), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
48 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOL. I: RULES 569 (2005) (us-
ing deductive analysis of lists of war crimes to define the roots of war crimes).
49 See GREEN, supra note 27, at 292 (explaining that even though offenses against
the Geneva Conventions are referred to as “grave breaches,” they carry the weight of
war crimes in international law).
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(c) (2006).  This statute defines war crimes as: [A]ny con-
duct— (1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at
Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United
States is a party; (2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October
1907; (3) which constitutes a violation of Common Article 3 of the international con-
ventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to
which the United States is a party and which deals with non-international armed con-
flict; or (4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the
provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
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privileged belligerent must fulfill this standard in order to consti-
tute a war crime.
It merits notice that unlike most international law sources, the
U.S. Army Field Manual does not require a “serious” violation of
the law of war to constitute a war crime, any violation of the law of
war will do.51  The Field Manual enumerates offenses, in addition
to grave breaches against the Geneva Conventions, to serve as rep-
resentative war crimes to guide adjudication if new types of war
crimes arise.52
Though it is not unprecedented for a national court to find
that a specific act is a war crime without international recognition,
the rarity of such an event precludes customary use.53  War crimi-
nality is not limited to violations of customary international law,
and includes applicable treaty law.54  Civilians are just as culpable
for war crimes as soldiers.55  While analysis of war crimes allows for
flexibility in interpretation to avoid needless pain and suffering in
wartime, murder by an unprivileged belligerent does not embody
this avoidance and intention.
Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as
amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully
kills or causes serious injury to civilians. Id.
51 See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 499, at 178 (“Every violation of the
law of war is a war crime.”).
52 Id. ¶ 504, at 180.  The Field Manual prescribes that: In addition to the “grave
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the following acts are representative of
violations of the law of war (“war crimes”): a. Making use of poisoned or otherwise
forbidden arms or ammunition; b. Treacherous request for quarter; c. Maltreatment
of dead bodies; d. Firing on localities which are undefended and without military
significance; e. Abuse of or firing on the flag of truce; f. Misuse of the Red Cross
emblem; g. Use of civilian clothing by troops to conceal their military character dur-
ing battle; h. Improper use of privileged buildings for military purposes; i. Poisoning
of wells or streams; j. Pillage or purposeless destruction; k. Compelling prisoners of
war to perform prohibited labor; l. Killing without trial spies or other persons who
have committed hostile acts; m. Compelling civilians to perform prohibited labor; n.
Violation of surrender terms. Id.
53 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 571 (illustrating how na-
tional courts found alleged war criminals guilty of war crimes during World War II
unlisted in the charters of the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo).
54 See id. at 572 (showing that war crimes can be both violations of customary inter-
national law or violations of applicable treaties).
55 See id. at 573 (providing an example of the type of analysis involved in determin-
ing whether an offense is considered a war crime).
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II. THE LEGAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND AL
QAEDA UNDER THE LAW OF WAR AND THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT
Since combatant privilege is the central question in murder by
an unprivileged belligerent, it is important to distinguish why
members of the Taliban may be entitled to combatant privilege
and why members of al Qaeda are correctly termed unprivileged
belligerents.  Al Qaeda’s attacks on various military and civilian lo-
cations around the world categorize them as a terrorist organiza-
tion.56  The Taliban ruled Afghanistan as a theocratic government
until the U.S. invasion in 2001.57  The key difference being that the
Taliban acted as a State, and al Qaeda did not.58
The White House press secretary announced on February 7,
2002, that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees “will be given
POW legal designation” under the Geneva Conventions.”59  Yet,
the President failed to distinguish between the Taliban as members
of the actual government of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda as members
of a non-state entity.  Furthermore, since both the Taliban, as the
government of Afghanistan, and the U.S. were parties to the Ge-
neva Conventions, their conflict constituted an international
armed conflict to which the Geneva Conventions and customary
international humanitarian law should have applied.60
56 See Aldrich, supra note 32, at 893 (“Al Qaeda is evidently a clandestine organiza-
tion consisting of elements in many countries and apparently composed of people of
various nationalities; it is dedicated to advancing certain political and religious objec-
tives by means of terrorist acts directed against the United States and other, largely
Western, nations.”).
57 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and
that engages in . . . formal relations with other such entities.”), quoted in Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995), with Afghanistan’s Taliban Rulers, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 9, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/cen-
tral/08/09/taliban.profile (reporting that only three countries—Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, and the United Arab Emirates—recognized the Taliban’s rule over
Afghanistan).
58 See Aldrich, supra note 32, at 894–96 (failing to understand the President’s rea-
soning in denying POW status to members of the Taliban since they constitute gov-
ernment forces and thus fall under privileged status under the Geneva Conventions).
59 Ari Fleischer, White House Spokesman, Special White House Announcement
Re: Application of Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan (Feb. 7, 2002).
60 See Aldrich, supra note 32, at 893 (emphasizing that the Taliban and al Qaeda
should not be grouped together under international law because the Taliban consti-
tuted the ruling government of Afghanistan); but cf. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (noting the
“perverse effect” of immunizing leaders of unrecognized states from the conse-
quences of violating international law, where recognized state actors would otherwise
be liable).
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Al Qaeda’s classification as a terrorist group also precludes its
members from certain POW protections under the Geneva Con-
ventions61 because of their previous attacks on the U.S. Embassy in
Kenya, the U.S.S. Cole bombing, and the 9/11 attacks.62  Even
while acknowledging that the U.S.S. Cole bombing was on a mili-
tary target, al Qaeda does not constitute part of the armed forces of
a State and accordingly, lacked lawful authority to carry out the
attacks.63
Hostilities with a non-state actor, absent any related hostilities
with a State, cannot trigger international armed conflict.64  Al
Qaeda’s attacks preceding October 7, 2001, and any attacks post-
October 7, 2001, without a clear, direct link to the armed conflict
with Afghanistan did not constitute a international or non-interna-
tional armed conflict.65  Accordingly, members of al Qaeda do not
qualify as lawful combatants under the law of international armed
conflict and have been accurately described as unprivileged
belligerents.
61 Compare Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138 (defining persons entitled to prisoner of war status as “[m]embers of other mili-
tias and members of other volunteer corps . . . [who] fulfil [sic] the following condi-
tions . . . that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war”), with RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 46, at 526 (indicating that terrorists
do not comply with the combatant obligation to follow the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict), and id. at 526 n.27 (defining terrorism as “the system-
atic attack on non-military objectives in order to force the military elements of the
adverse Party to comply with the wishes of the attacker by means of the fear and
anguish induced by such an attack”).
62 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft Over the
High Seas in the Global War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REV. 73, 77–78 (2007) (stating that al
Qaeda has been held responsible for the August 7, 1998 bombing in Kenya, the Octo-
ber 12, 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and the September 11, 2001 attacks).
63 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 229 (distinguishing al Qaeda objectives as a terrorist
organization from those of state actors involved in armed conflict). But see WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 35 (2d ed. 2004)
(“The problem with a distinct crime of terrorism lies in definition, it being often said
that ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.’”).
64 See Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, ¶ 7, at 3 (specifying that an international armed
conflict may involve non-State actors, but an actual international armed conflict re-
quires at least one state on each side).
65 See id. ¶¶ 10–11, at 4 (applying a sine qua non of international armed conflict
that an international armed conflict only began on Oct. 7, 2001 between the U.S. and
Afghanistan). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006) (in order to
exercise jurisdiction by a tribunal convened to try Hamdan, the offense “must have
been committed within the period of the war.” (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 7, at
837)).
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III. MURDER BY AN UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
War crimes involve inhumane methods of causing death, not
causing the death itself, which is an inherent part of war.  A com-
parison of the enumerated war crimes in each major international
convention, court, and statute reveals that murder by an un-
privileged belligerent is not listed in any international legal instru-
ment.66  This confirms the belief that while new offenses violating
the law of war will continue to arise with the evolution of warfare,
the unilateral creation of a war crime should be looked at with a
high level of scrutiny.67
Regardless of this evolution, murder by an unprivileged bellig-
erent is not governed currently by the law of war.  When a belliger-
ent is declared unprivileged, international law removes the mantle
of protection provided by lawful status under the law of armed
combat.68  But when an individual is not a formal member of an
armed force that is party to the conflict, he falls outside interna-
tional legal protection.69  He is simply a plain belligerent or civilian
and would automatically fall under the domestic rule of law, which
66 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 574–99 (listing war crimes
by international legal instrument with commentary on each charge under each instru-
ment).  The list of war crimes were based on:
(1) grave breaches included in the Geneva Conventions based on crimes pursued by
the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo; (2) crimes derived
from other war crimes trials after the Second World War; (3) violations of customary
international law listed in Additional Protocol I and as war crimes in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court committed during an international armed conflict ; (4)
war crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court developed since the
adoption of Additional Protocol I in 1977 and committed during an international
armed conflict; (5) crimes not referred to in the Statute of the International Criminal
Court but recognized as violations of customary international law committed during
an armed international conflict; (6) serious violations of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions; (7) other serious violations of customary international law dur-
ing a non-international armed conflict included in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court and in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone; (8) violations of Additional Protocol II and of
customary international law during a non-international armed conflict; (9) other seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law during a non-international armed
conflict listed as war crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court; (10)
war crimes recognized by State practice during non-international conflict. Id.
67 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780 n.34 (limiting the evolutionary nature of the
common law to an incremental development by the judiciary). See also Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The requirement that a rule command
the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become binding upon them all is a strin-
gent one.”)
68 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (contrasting the removal of immunity with an
offense against the law of international armed conflict).
69 See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 230 (distinguishing between formal combatants
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is enforceable when an individual does not have combatant
immunity.70
The simplest explanation predicates war as a game.  Playing
this game is illegal, unless you fulfill certain conditions that give
you benefits.71  Without these benefits, a player commits illegal acts
(the domestic crime of murder) by simply participating (killing
someone).72  Murder by an unprivileged belligerent is playing the
game without benefits, illegal activity that places the individual
under domestic law.
A benefited player plays the game according to specific rules.73
A benefited player can be disciplined for breaking these specific
rules.  Breaking these rules constitutes a war crime.74  An un-
benefited player cannot break these rules because he is not part of
the game.  If he kills someone, he will be subject to a murder
charge under domestic law but not a war crime.75  A war crime inher-
ently requires an overt infraction of the law of war, not just com-
mitting a domestic crime without combatant immunity, i.e.
privileged status.76
A more perplexing issue arises after realizing that the DOD
created the crimes and offenses under MCI No. 2 after the war in
among nations and other individuals outside the law of war that promulgate attacks
for their own ends, not the ends of a State).
70 See Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, ¶ 38, at 12–13 (“[T]he unprivileged belligerent
who kills a combatant is subject to prosecution for murder pursuant to the domestic
law of States with subject matter jurisdiction over the offense and personal jurisdic-
tion over the accused.”).
71 Cf. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 19, U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S at 138
(delineating the conditions necessary to qualify as a prisoner of war, i.e. lawful
combatant).
72 See U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32 (establishing that the offense of
murder, without privileged status under the law of war, is illegal under domestic law).
73 Cf. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 2, at 3 (stating that armed conflict
is governed by the law of land warfare which includes law enumerated in legal treaties
and customary law which may apply even if not enumerated in a written instrument of
law).
74 See supra Part I.B (defining war crimes as violations of the law of war, armed
combat, and Geneva Conventions).
75 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (stating that domestically defined criminal
acts committed by an individual without privileged status under the law of armed
international combat removes the mantle of combatant immunity, thus placing the
individual under domestic law). See also Mohammed Ali v. Public Prosecutor, [1968]
3 All ER 488, 497, 1 A.C. 430 (1969) (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) (ap-
peal taken from Malay) (holding that two members of the Indonesian armed forces
who committed sabotage while wearing civilian clothes in Singapore could be tried
under Malaysian domestic law because they did not comply with the requirements of
Geneva Convention III Article 4(A)(2) and were not operating as members of the
Indonesian armed forces at the time).
76 See generally supra Part I.B.
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Afghanistan began.  The DOD charged the detainees with offenses
that were not war crimes at the time of their commission, constitut-
ing a violation of international (and domestic) ex post facto laws.77
Furthermore, even if a national court, trying an unprivileged com-
batant, finds a sufficiently-alleged war crime, the court cannot pros-
ecute the accused under that war crime unless it was an offense at
the time of commission.78
The DOD created the charge of murder by an unprivileged
belligerent well after the invasion of Afghanistan79 in MCI No. 2,80
making it impermissible to allow a detainee’s prosecution under
this charge.  Furthermore, because of the ex post facto protections
in the Geneva Conventions and other international law instru-
ments, the charge is invalid and should not be evaluated by the
“regularly constituted court” responsible for trying the detainee.81
Nevertheless, a nuanced view of war criminality during the war in
Afghanistan requires an understanding of other possible war
crimes, statuses, and categorizations that could be confused with
murder by an unprivileged belligerent.
A. Perfidy
Perfidy is defined as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an ad-
versary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to
accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.”82  Con-
77 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 290–92 (1993) (defining the “[p]rotection from ex post
facto laws” as a “guarantee[ ] that crimes and punishments will not be created ad hoc to
be applied retroactively to particular cases” and stating that ex post facto protection is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, art. I, § 9, and by ninety-five other na-
tions’ constitutions).
78 See generally Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 397 (1798) (prohibiting the passage of
criminal ex post facto law).
79 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the President of the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7,
2001) (The U.S. informed the U.N. Security Council that it was responding with mili-
tary force in Afghanistan in reaction to “the armed attacks carried out against the
United States.”).
80 MCI NO. 2, supra note 8 (declaring that murder by an unprivileged belligerent
is an offense on April 30, 2003, almost two and a half years after the invasion of
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001).
81 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138
(affording all the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable to civilized people,
which likely includes protection from ex post facto criminality due to its enumeration
in the U.S. Constitution and 95 other national constitutions); see also Bassiouni, supra
note 77, at 290.
82 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
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ceptually, perfidy is similar to murder by an unprivileged belliger-
ent.  Military manuals around the world,83 including the U.S. Army
Field Manual,84 recognize perfidy as a war crime.
Yet, because perfidy relies on intentional subterfuge in order
to kill, wound, or capture an enemy, it requires conduct beyond
murder by an unprivileged belligerent.  An unprivileged belliger-
ent does not possess combatant immunity and other privileges in-
herent in lawful combat,85 but does not necessarily kill through
deceit.  Because the DOD alleges it is solely the act of murder itself,
without privilege, that creates war criminality,86 an allegation of
perfidy would require specific facts that an individual actively mis-
led an enemy—outside the law of war—to actuate a killing.
B. Guerrilla and Irregular Warfare
The U.S. Army Field Manual states that “[p]ersons . . . who
take up arms and commit hostile acts without having complied
with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition
as belligerents . . . [are] not entitled to be treated as prisoners of
war . . . .”87  Scholars disagree whether guerrillas by definition vio-
late the law of war due to their status and non-compliance with the
Geneva Conventions’ conditions for recognition as a privileged
combatant.88  Yet, ratification of Additional Protocol I does not re-
quire irregular or resistance forces to identify themselves.  Irregu-
lar forces are only required to be under proper command, and
83 See generally HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 203–26 (summariz-
ing the customary international humanitarian rules against deception through an
analysis of individual States’ military manuals).
84 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 50, at 22 (defining perfidy as securing
an advantage over the enemy by lying or breaching faith or “moral obligation to speak
the truth” such as feigning surrender to secure an advantage over an enemy).
85 See supra Part I.A (providing background on the effects of lacking privilege
under the law of armed combat).
86 See MCI NO. 2, supra note 8 (defining murder by an unprivileged belligerent
based on the three primary elements of killing or severely injuring, lacking privilege,
and occurring during an armed conflict).
87 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 80, at 34 (internal citations omitted).
88 Compare Baxter, supra note 25, at 337 (asserting that “genuine allegiance” and
“licit and laudable” purposes in the view of the State that they are supporting would
provide sufficient justification to preclude international criminality), and id. at 337–38
n.4 (noting that “[a]lthough some guerrillas may engage in . . . the war crime[ ] of
murder . . . , it is somewhat naı̈ve to suppose that . . . guerrillas never devote them-
selves to the same missions as the regular armed forces[,]” so that guerrillas should
not necessarily be considered “bandits” or “pirates” (citing Willard B. Cowles, Univer-
sality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177, 181–203 (1945))), with GREEN,
supra note 27, at 117 (“Irregular forces and resistance movements are only protected
so long as they satisfy the normal requirements for recognition as combatants . . . .”).
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carry their arms openly, when attacking or deploying preparatory
to an attack.89
It is unlikely that the Taliban would fall under such a classifica-
tion since members of the Taliban army were combatants of a rec-
ognized government (even if they were not recognized by the
U.S.).90  With regard to al Qaeda, the operations conducted by al
Qaeda against the Northern Alliance could categorize them as an
irregular force.91  Although al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan
prior to the invasion by the U.S.,92 its operations alongside the
Taliban could confirm the presumption that the Taliban accepted
al Qaeda’s allegiance and fought alongside them in some in-
stances.93  Therefore, if a member of al Qaeda killed a soldier dur-
ing battle alongside the Taliban, he could be categorized as a
privileged combatant.  This is still predicated on compliance with
the Article 4(A) requirements for privileged combatancy.94  Al
Qaeda’s terrorist operations outside Afghanistan flagrantly violate
the laws of war and would immediately preclude them from privi-
89 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is repre-
sented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse
Party.  Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary sys-
tem which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of interna-
tional law applicable in armed conflict.
Id.
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant can-
not so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, pro-
vided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) During
each military engagement, and (b) During such time as he is visible to
the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Id.
90 See supra note 57 (acknowledging the Taliban’s recognition by Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates).
91 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (“Al Qaeda fighters constitute irregular
forces.”).
92 See Memorandum from Richard Clarke to Condoleezza Rice on Presidential Pol-
icy Initiative/Review—The Al Qida [sic] Network (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20memo.pdf (implying the
presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan by asking whether the National Security Council
should support the Northern Alliance to provide a viable opposition force in Afghani-
stan against al Qaeda/Taliban).
93 See GOLDMAN & TITTEMORE, supra note 32, at 30 (categorizing the al Qaeda fight-
ers who fought alongside the Taliban in brigades or other units as irregular forces
who still needed to comply with Article 4A(2) of Geneva Convention III to qualify for
privileged status).
94 Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
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leged combatant status.95
IV. MURDER BY AN UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT UNDER HAMDAN
V. RUMSFELD
While the Supreme Court did not directly discuss murder by
an unprivileged belligerent within the four corners of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the opinion does provide a solid footing for an analysis of
the charge.96  Although U.S. military law does not consider the se-
verity of the offense when determining a war crime,97 Hamdan es-
tablished that an act does not become a crime without its
“foundations having been firmly established in precedent.”98  Be-
cause murder by an unprivileged belligerent reflects neither the
characteristics of any of the representative war crimes presented in
the U.S. Army Field Manual99 nor the war crimes recognized under
international law,100 the government did not make the “substantial
showing” necessary to establish murder by an unprivileged belliger-
ent as an offense violating the law of war.101  Murder by an un-
privileged belligerent may be prosecuted as a domestic crime, not a
war crime.102
The Supreme Court explained that while it is permissible for
the government to try the alleged offense even if the charge is not
95 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (asserting that “Al Qaeda’s contempt” for privi-
leged combatancy “was flaunted in the execution of the original armed attack of 9/
11”). See also GOLDMAN & TITTEMORE, supra note 32, at 29 (agreeing with the Presi-
dent and Defense Secretary’s depiction of al Qaeda as an international terrorist or-
ganization that conducted private hostilities against the U.S. for which they may be
punished).
96 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780–85 (2006) (providing an analyti-
cal procedure to determine whether an offense constitutes a war crime through the
charge of conspiracy against Salim Hamdan).
97 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
98 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780 n.34. See also Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
881 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting international law as it has evolved among the nations
of the world today through customary international law, rather than a static view of
international law from 1789).
99 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 504, at 180. See also supra note 52 and
accompanying text (failing to list any violation of the law of war involving the juxtapo-
sition of combatant status and killing).
100 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 574–99 (analyzing all the
war crimes listed in any international legal instrument recognized by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and finding no relationship to murder by an un-
privileged belligerent).
101 Cf. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780 (concluding that the conspiracy charge in
Hamdan’s case did not meet the “substantial showing” burden because the charge
had rarely been tried by any law-of-war military commission and did not appear in the
Geneva Conventions or the Hague Conventions).
102 U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32.
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defined by statute or treaty,103 the precedent must be “plain and
unambiguous.”104  Even if a source does exist, it must satisfy the
Court’s “high standard of clarity required to justify the use of a
military commission.”105  In the Court’s analysis of the conspiracy
charge against the defendant, the burden was “far from satisfied”
since that crime has “rarely if ever been tried” in this country and is
absent from the Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions.106
It is difficult to imagine that murder by an unprivileged bellig-
erent would fulfill this burden without previous consideration by a
law-of-war military commission.107  The government’s difficulty in
satisfying its burden is underscored by the charge’s absence from
customary international law108, and from the law of armed com-
bat.109  Thus, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hamdan substanti-
ates the fact that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war
crime triable by military commission.
V. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA) into effect on October 17, 2006.  While recognizing presi-
dential authority to constitute military commissions, the MCA pro-
vides a working legislative framework for the commissions.
Previously, the DOD operated under a presidential military order
by enforcing the MCI since there was no legislative mandate.110
103 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780 (stating that Congress incorporated the common
law of war through the adoption of Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).
104 Id. (fearing that lesser expectations would risk giving the military a degree of
adjudicative and punitive power beyond the levels defined by statute or the
Constitution).
105 Id. at 2781 (determining that the three sources cited by the government to jus-
tify the trial of conspiracy in a military commission do not adequately meet the
Court’s standard).
106 Id. at 2780–81 (adding that other international law sources confirmed that con-
spiracy was not a violation of the law of war).
107 See generally MCI NO. 2, supra note 8 (defining murder by an unprivileged bellig-
erent for the first time on the instructions’ April 30, 2003, release date).
108 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 574–99 (recognizing the
absence of murder by an unprivileged belligerent from any war crime defined by a
customary international humanitarian legal instrument).
109 See supra Part III (concluding that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a
war crime under the law of armed combat).
110 See Press Release, George W. Bush, President Issues Military Order: Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13,
2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (rely-
ing on his authority as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to
constitute military commissions).
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Because the MCI were based on the original presidential military
order that has now been superceded, MCI No. 2 is no longer en-
forceable.  It is replaced by the definitions in the MCA.111
Rather than retaining the charge of murder by an un-
privileged belligerent, the MCA splits the charge into two war
crimes.  The first charge is the murder of protected persons,112 a
clear violation of Geneva Convention IV,113 and the second, mur-
der in violation of the law of war.114  Both apply only to those per-
sons subject to military commissions under the MCA, defined as
“[a]ny alien unlawful enemy combatant[s] . . . .”115  Since civilians,
or “unlawful enemy combatants,” can commit war crimes,116 these
two charges follow the norms of international law using the prior
analytical critique of murder by an unprivileged belligerent.117
Congress corrected the DOD’s error in the MCIs.
VI. AVAILABLE SYSTEMS OF ADJUDICATION
A. Available Court Systems
If murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime
triable by military commission, exploring other court systems will
likely shed light on more appropriate options.  Though it is possi-
ble for a national legislature to expand its definition of war crimes,
the definition would only apply to its own nationals if it fell outside
111 See Military Comm’ns Act of 2006 [hereinafter MCA], 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)
(2006) (defining the crimes triable by military commission).
112 See id. § 950v(b)(1) (defining “Murder of protected persons” as “[a]ny person
subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be
punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this
chapter may direct”); id. § 950v(a)(2) (defining “protected person” as “any person
entitled to protection under one or more of the Geneva Conventions, including—
(A) civilians not taking an acting part in hostilities; (B) military personnel placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, or detention; and (C) military medical or religious
personnel”).
113 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 781, 788
(including the willful killing of a protected person as a grave breach of the
Convention).
114 See MCA § 950v(b)(15) (defining “Murder in violation of the law of war” as
“[a]ny person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons,
including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death
or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct”).
115 Id. § 948c.
116 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 573.
117 See supra Part III (concluding that the primary discrepancy with murder by an
unprivileged belligerent is its categorization as a war crime when it should be treated
as a domestic crime and acknowledging that murder alone does not create war crimi-
nality, but murder in violation of other aspects of international humanitarian law
may).
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the bounds of international law.118  Domestic jurisdiction over in-
ternational law derives from the universality principle119 that allows
federal courts to assert jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, tor-
ture, and war.120  Assuming murder by an unprivileged belligerent
is not a violation of the law of war, a detainee should be prosecuted
under domestic instruments, which include the military’s general
courts-martial and federal courts.121
The universality principle would allow the U.S. to try war
criminals in federal court,122 including war criminals of both inter-
national and non-international armed conflict.123  Universal crimes
encompass such “common crimes as murder,” allowing the U.S. to
prosecute a detainee for murder by an unprivileged belligerent.124
Comity concerns regarding federal court involvement in military
affairs would also be inapplicable because, like Hamdan, Guantá-
namo detainees are not a part of the U.S. military forces and their
118 GREEN, supra note 27, at 293. But cf. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir.
1995) (establishing that a violation of “ ‘well-established, universally recognized norms
of international law,’” and not “‘idiosyncratic legal rules,’” confers federal jurisdic-
tion under the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (quoting Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 888, 881 (2d Cir. 1980))).
119 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987) (stating that the premise of universal jurisdiction is allowing a State juris-
diction to define and punish certain crimes recognized by the community of nations
as of a universal concern). See also id. § 702 (universal violations of international law
include “(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disap-
pearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimina-
tion, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights”).
120 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring) (referencing the universality principle
in order to assert domestic jurisdiction over certain international offenses). See also
Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (recognizing torture as a universally denounced crime);
United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (mentioning universal
jurisdiction to justify punishing terrorists).
121 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785 (2006) (clarifying that the gov-
ernment’s failure to meet the standard necessary to prosecute an offense under mili-
tary commissions would not preclude its trial under domestic instruments); see also
Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (“Federal jurisdiction over cases involving international law is
clear.”).
122 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 604–05 (stating that univer-
sal jurisdiction is supported extensively by national legislation).  States party to the
Geneva Conventions are obligated to include universal jurisdiction in their laws for
“grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions in order to ensure that the world is free
to try war criminals wherever it makes the most sense. Id. at 606–07.
123 See id. at 604–05 (stating that several people have been tried in non-interna-
tional armed conflicts for war crimes as a result of the universal jurisdiction
principle).
124 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (6th ed. 2003)
(incorporating common criminality into the universality principle).
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trial in the military’s general courts-martial system is unlikely.125
The Supreme Court considered trial in general courts-martial
in the Hamdan decision.126  Congressional hearings on the pos-
sibilities surrounding use of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) in trials after Hamdan heard from military lawyers encour-
aging the use of military commissions under the direction of gen-
eral courts-martial.127  Their proposals allowed for departures from
general courts-martial procedure as deemed practicable by the
President.128  However, this may come into conflict with the strin-
gent uniformity principle that surrounds departures from the pro-
cedures laid-out for use by courts-martial.129  Regardless of this
allowance for potential procedural deviations, Article 21 of the
UCMJ still provides jurisdiction over a military commission
system.130
125 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770–72 (citing that the two considerations of comity
that favor abstention by federal courts from ongoing military proceedings, listed in
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752, 758 (1975), would not apply because
Hamdan is not a member of U.S. armed forces and the system convened to try
Hamdan is not a part of the U.S. military courts system).
126 See generally id. at 2774–77 (discussing Article 21, 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (2006), and
Article 36, 10 U.S.C.A. § 836 (2006), of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
governing law of the military).
127 See, e.g., Military Commissions in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the S. Comm. on
Armed Services,  109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Eugene R. Fidell, President of the
National Institute of Military Justice and Partner at Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell
LLP) [hereinafter Fidell statement] (urging Congress to use the Manual for Courts-
Martial, so the commission procedures will be guided the rules for general courts-
martial, while recognizing the President’s power to depart from that framework). See
generally Major Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal
to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7–10 (2005) (providing a
concise history of the development of U.S. military law).
128 See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000). (a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, includ-
ing modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, mili-
tary commissions, and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry,
may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be
contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter; (b) All rules and regulations made
under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable. Id.
129 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (stating that any “departure[ ] from the proce-
dures” of court-martial “must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it” (citing
WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 835 n.81)). See also Fidell statement, supra note 127, at 4–6
(asserting three proposals that would check the President’s power to change courts-
martial procedure: (1) requiring the President to state with “particularity” the facts
that render a procedure impracticable, (2) requiring that Congress be notified of
impracticability, and (3) making an impracticability determination subject to judicial
review for abuse of discretion or illegality).
130 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (“The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdic-
tion upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
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Since war crimes are not applicable here, the unlawful bellig-
erent should be prosecuted under domestic law.131  Under Addi-
tional Protocol I, international law prevails over national law in
domestic courts, providing, at the very minimum, the fundamental
guarantees delineated by Article 75.132  While it would be possible
for an unlawful combatant to be a war criminal,133 crimes by an
unprivileged belligerent fall under the domestic law in their coun-
try of capture.134  Ultimately though, the Guantánamo detainees
will almost certainly be tried in the U.S. whether they committed a
crime of murder under Afghan domestic law, or whether they com-
mitted a war crime of murder by an unprivileged belligerent, as the
DOD asserts.  The universality principle allows all States to punish
in their own courts for both types of crime.135
Presumably, the Administration created the “war crimes” and
“other offenses” in MCI No. 2 to prosecute the detainees under
international law.  This is a strong concern because U.S. domestic
law does not apply to “enemy personnel” charged with war
crimes136 and war criminality falls under the jurisdiction of several
military and international courts.137  Placing war crimes under in-
ternational humanitarian law provides a flexibility that domestic
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that
by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals.”).
131 See U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 16–17 (determining that
even though murder alone does not qualify as a war crime under international law, it
still requires prosecution under domestic law).
132 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38 (“In order to avoid any
doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused of war crimes or
crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: (a) Persons who are
accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and trial
in accordance with the applicable rules of international law . . . .”).
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (noting the possibility that an unlawful com-
batant may intentionally commit a serious breach of the law of international armed
conflict).
134 See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 81, at 34 (“Persons who, without
having complied with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition as
belligerents . . . commit hostile acts about or behind the lines of the enemy are not to
be treated as prisoners of war and may be tried and sentenced to execution or impris-
onment.” (internal citations omitted)).
135 See Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in INT’L LAW STUD-
IES VOL. 71, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17 (Michael
N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (defining the bounds of the universality
principle).
136 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 505(e), at 180–81 (asserting that “en-
emy personnel” are to be tried directly under international law).
137 Id. ¶ 505(d), at 180 (allowing jurisdiction to general courts-martial, military
commissions, provost courts, military government courts, other military tribunals of
the U.S., and international tribunals).
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law precludes, such as “forum shopping” or a higher evidentiary
standard.138  Both before and after Hamdan, international tribunals
have been proposed to try detainees,139 which would present a
good framework140 were it not for the U.S. aversion to interna-
tional courts.141
Another option is repatriation and trial in the court system of
the detainee’s national origin.  This option presents a complex is-
sue since a POW’s release after the end of hostilities necessarily
“implies that another state is vouching for their future peaceable
behavior.”142  Such an implication would be problematic for an or-
ganization whose command structure is unaffiliated with any par-
ticular State and stretches across many States rather than within
just one.143
Ultimately, the end result will be political and not legal.144  In
138 See Dinstein, supra note 135, at 18–19, 26, 30–33 (describing how the universal-
ity principle gives States great flexibility to prosecute war criminals in a court of their
choosing).
139 See, e.g., Human Rights First, The U.S. Should Build on an Existing International
Tribunal to Try Potential Al Qaeda or Taliban Suspects, Nov. 28, 2001, http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/after_911/after_911_06.htm (recommending the
creation of an international criminal tribunal mirroring the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shortly after the 9/11 attacks); Douglas W. Kmiec,
In the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Decision, Should We Opt for an
International Tribunal for Gitmo Detainees?, FindLaw.com, July 6, 2006, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060706_kmiec.html (describing alternatives
to detaining enemy combatants without trial, including redirecting some more seri-
ous criminals to one of the ad hoc international tribunals such as that for Kosovo or
East Timor).
140 See Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law for the Twenty-First Century, in INT’L LAW
STUDIES, VOL. 71: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 325, 326
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (“The work of both tribunals[, the
Hague Tribunal and the International Tribunal,] demonstrates that international in-
vestigations and prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law are possible and credible.”).
141 See, e.g., Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, International Criminal Court:
Letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (withdrawing the United States’ signa-
ture from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and resigning all
legal obligations from its initial signing). But see Statement of the United States Dele-
gation to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court (Mar. 23, 1998), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/
USDel3_23_98.pdf (urging congressional support for a “no war nexus” approach to
crimes against humanity in the creation of the International Criminal Court).
142 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 230 (explaining problems likely to arise from catego-
rizing terrorists as unlawful belligerents rather than as POWs).
143 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (distinguishing between the relative uniformity
of the Taliban forces and the “assemblage of Moslem fanatics from all parts of the
world” of al Qaeda).
144 Compare In Retreat, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2006, at 29 (contrasting the Bush Admin-
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theory, any legal adjudicatory alternative to the commission system
would provide justice and retribution to those detainees who com-
mitted crimes.  Security issues, however, weigh heavily in the eyes
of the U.S. government,145 and compromise will be required to ad-
dress those concerns while seeking an effective court for trial.
B. The Needed Modification of the Commission System
The court system chosen to try the Guantánamo detainees
must comply with the Hamdan decision.146  Congress must create “a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
that are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”147  While
the Geneva Conventions did not directly define the term “regularly
constituted court,” there remains some guidance in the Geneva
Conventions IV commentary, Common Article 3, and the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross.148  It seems clear that an as-
sumption of substantive and procedural uniformity with a State’s
existing laws should be the overarching theme in a system created
to try detainees.149
istration’s eventual concession on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions with
the consistently measured approach of State Department legal advisor John Bellinger
on the applicability of international law in the “War on Terror”), with U.S. Dep’t of
Def. Update - July 11, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/For-the-
record/documents/20060711.html (asserting that the England Detainee Treatment
Memo does not change any Defense policies as a result of the Hamdan decision be-
cause “the doctrine, policies, instructions, and procedures that have been in effect
have always had humane treatment as their standard”).
145 See Donald Rumsfeld, Dep’t of Defense News Briefing on Military Commissions
(Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2002/t03212002_t032
1sd.html (“The commissions are intended to be different . . . because the [P]resident
recognized that there had to be differences to deal with the unusual situation we face
and that a different approach was needed. . . .”).
146 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (holding that the com-
mission convened by the President to try Hamdan “does not meet those [flexible,
general] requirements” of Common Article 3, and therefore lacks the power to “try
[him] and subject him to criminal punishment”).
147 Id. at 2796 (quoting Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75
U.N.T.S. 136–38).  The Court emphasized that “ ‘the scope of [Common Article 3] . . .
must be as wide as possible.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Geneva Conven-
tion III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3318–20, 75 U.N.T.S. 136–38 (stating Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention III).
148 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (equating “properly constituted” and “regu-
larly constituted” in Article 66); HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 355
(defining “regularly constituted court” as used in Common Article 3 as “established
and organised in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a coun-
try”). See also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3318–20, 75 U.N.T.S. 136–38.
149 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791 n.50 (“Indeed, the suggestion that Congress did
not intend uniformity across tribunal types is belied by the textual proximity of subsec-
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Pending Congressional authorization for military commissions
as required by the Supreme Court,150 the U.S. must simply follow
the procedures of general courts-martial as stated under the UCMJ
as far as practicable.151  Courts-martial law provides more clear
standing than the civil cases in federal court, many of which relied
on the Alien Tort Claims Act in addition to the universality princi-
ple for jurisdiction.152  While the Geneva Conventions are prima-
rily concerned with administering justice with safeguards aimed at
eliminating the possibility of judicial error, it merits emphasis to
say that the Convention seeks to only prohibit “summary” justice.153
An oversight system regarding changes in courts-martial pro-
cedure by the President should also be activated.  The National In-
stitute of Military Justice proposed a system sufficiently insulated
from executive power: the President would be required to articu-
late the facts that render a procedure impracticable, to notify Con-
gress of any determination of impracticability, and to subject a
Presidential determination to judicial review.154
The government will undoubtedly have security concerns re-
garding the dissemination of classified materials during trials.155
In the previous military commission system, any evidence was ad-
missible if it “would have probative value to a reasonable per-
tion (a) (which requires that the rules governing criminal trials in federal district
courts apply, absent the President’s determination of impracticability, to courts-mar-
tial, provost courts, and military commissions alike) and subsection (b) (which imposes
the uniformity requirement).”).
150 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (stating that the “Presidential authority to con-
vene military commissions” must be justified by the “Constitution and laws,” including
the law of war and Uniform Code of Military Justice; Congress’s Authorization for the
Use of Military Force, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 do not meet this stan-
dard for Congressional authorization). See also Authorization for the Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
151 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791 (concluding that “the rules set forth in the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial must apply to military commissions unless impracticable”). See
also Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 810 (2007).
152 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (using the “universal con-
cern” standard to justify federal jurisdiction).
153 See RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 46, at 40 (emphasizing that no sort of
immunity is meant by the clause but that members of the “insurgent forces should not
be treated as common criminals”), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/1a13044f
3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/466097d7a301f8c4c12563cd00424e2b!OpenDocument.
154 See Fidell statement, supra note 127, at 3–6 (recommending an appropriate over-
sight system to prevent the executive from exercising too much authority over the
judicial system).
155 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (stating that “the Government has a compelling
interest in denying Hamdan access to certain sensitive information”). But see id. at
2792 n.52 (asserting that “the structural and procedural defects of Hamdan’s commis-
sion extend far beyond rules preventing access to classified information”).
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son.”156  This standard would have allowed testimonial hearsay and
evidence obtained through coercion.157  In order to rectify the gov-
ernment security concerns with the military rules of evidence, the
rules should adopt a system like that of Rule 92 bis of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.158  Rule 92 bis
(D) and (E) require that a party seeking to admit any “transcript of
evidence given by a witness” must “give fourteen days notice to the
opposing party,” who then has seven days to object.159  The trial
chamber then decides whether to admit the evidence after hearing
the parties’ arguments for or against admissibility, or requiring the
witness to come in for cross examination.160  Here, the admissibility
determination would move beyond sole judicial determination
while also allowing discussion of admissibility in camera to assuage
security concerns.  It would provide careful review of evidence ob-
tained through means that “cast substantial doubt on its reliability”
and are “antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity
of the proceedings.”161
It is unlikely that Common Article 3 would be subverted if the
156 Id. at 2786 (citing DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMM’N ORDER, NO. 1 § 6(D)(1)
(2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.
pdf).
157 See KENNETH HURWITZ, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: A
GUIDE TO THE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (identifying the admission of testi-
mony received through torture as “[o]ne of the most troubling features of the mili-
tary commission rules”). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004)
(“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evi-
dence from the Government in such a proceeding.”).
158 Cf. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792 (lacking a “suggestion . . . of any logistical diffi-
culty” from the government “in securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence
or in applying the usual principles of relevance and admissibility”).
159 See Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Applica-
tion to Admit Transcripts Under Rule 92 Bis, ¶ 1 (May 23, 2001), reprinted in 7 ANNO-
TATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001, at 120 (André Klip & Göran
Sluiter eds., 2005) [hereinafter ANNOTATED LEADING CASES], available at http://
www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev39e.pdf.
160 Id.
161 Rome Statute, supra note 47, at Article 69(7); International Criminal Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991
(ICTY), Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (2006), Rules
89(C) and 95, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/
IT032Rev39e.pdf; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (2006), Rules 89(C) and 95, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
rules/101106/rop101106.pdf. See also Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, ¶ 3 (balancing the
sub-Rule 89 (C) and (D) regarding whether “a Chamber ‘may admit any relevant
evidence which it deems to have probative value’ and may exclude evidence ‘if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial’” (inter-
nal citations omitted)); id. ¶ 4 (stressing that the determination of whether “a witness
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UCMJ were utilized to try “unlawful combatants.”  The procedures
of the MCA are “based” on the UCMJ,162 purport to establish a
regularly constituted court under Common Article 3 of Geneva
Convention III,163 and provide congressional oversight over
changes in procedures.164  Detainees, however, are prohibited
from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights,165 may
not view “sensitive” information against them,166 and may still have
hearsay evidence used against them.167  It is yet to be determined
whether the MCA will provide the necessary checks and balances to
mirror general courts-martial.  However, the Supreme Court speci-
fied that the treatment and trials of the detainees were to comply
with Common Article 3,168 and it should thus act as a floor for the
trials, and not a ceiling.
CONCLUSION
The end of hostilities brings even greater questions, especially
in a rhetorical war like the “War on Terror.”  The questions sur-
rounding the legitimacy of the commission offenses will undoubt-
edly affect future questions after the “War on Terror” has ended.
For instance, determining an end to the hostilities would likely be a
contentious issue since an agreement on the cessation of hostilities
depends on the nature of the conflict in question.169  Only then
would questions regarding possible repatriation be raised.
According to customary international law, the U.S. govern-
ment would be required to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
the detainees for their participation in non-international armed
combat (or those imprisoned for reasons related to armed combat)
except for those accused of, or sentenced for, war crimes.170  How-
ever, the U.N. Security Council, among other national bodies, con-
should be required to appear for cross-examination” should hinge on whether, with-
out such live testimony, the court could still “ensure a fair trial”).
162 MCA § 948b(c).
163 Id. § 948b(f).
164 Id. § 949a(d).
165 Id. § 948b(g).
166 Id. § 949d(f).
167 Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii).
168 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
169 See CHRISTIANE SHIELDS DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF
WAR AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES: A STUDY OF ARTICLE 118, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE
3RD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 100
(1977) (recognizing that a cessation of hostilities may take many forms under heavy
dependence on the type of conflict involved).
170 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 611 (establishing a rule that
grants broad amnesty to detainees participating in non-international armed combat
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firmed that the amnesty does not apply to war crimes.171
The Department of Defense overstepped its bounds by trying
to create law without the necessary precedent. Murder by an un-
privileged belligerent lacks any legitimate basis in international
law.  While recognizing that the common law is “evolutionary in
nature,”172 the U.S. judiciary will always require solid foundations
in precedent.173  But shifting an individual’s culpability from that
of common criminality to that of war criminality through technical-
ities in combatant privilege is a contortion in law for an indepen-
dent executive purpose.  It is this type of contortion of executive
power for independent, political purposes that the judiciary must
check during both formal174 and informal175 times of war.
through State practice as a norm of customary international law applicable in non-
international armed conflict).
171 See id. at 613 (showing that war crimes are the exception to the general amnesty
at the end of hostilities).
172 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2829 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“. . . building upon the
experience of the past and taking account of the exigencies of the present”).
173 See id. at 2779–80 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 2780 n.34 (“The caution
that must be exercised in the incremental development of common-law crimes by the
judiciary is, for the reasons explained in the text, all the more critical when reviewing
developments that stem from military action.”).
174 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (de-
claring President Franklin Roosevelt’s interference in the steel industry strikes during
World War II as overstepping executive constitutional powers as Commander in
Chief).
175 See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that the
“War on Terror” did not give President George W. Bush a “blank check” for executive
authority).

